Tag Archives: STOCK BUYBACKS

The Mechanics of Stock Buybacks

Conclusion: From the Shareholders perspective most Stock Buybacks produce little benefit when compared to investing the same funds in the company. They produce a onetime gain in Earnings per Share (usually small) but contribute nothing to the growth of the Net Profit or Market Capitalization. If a company is truly unable to successfully invest the Buyback funds in its business, it would be much better for the majority of shareholders to receive a Special Dividend.

For the twelve months ending September 2016, total share buybacks were close to $600 billion for the S&P 500 companies. This is an enormous amount of money being 66% of the earnings and only slightly less than Fixed Capital Expenditures in the same period. The average buyback program resulted in a “buyback yield” of just shy of 3% [1] . This resulted in a very modest annual decline in the shares outstanding which led to an equally modest one time gain in Earnings per Share for the Shareholders, i.e. the vast majority who did not sell their shares.

Because Buybacks and Dividend Yield are considered to be returns to the Shareholder they tend to be lumped together in statements like the “Total Shareholder Yield is currently close to 5% comprised of a 2% dividend yield and a 3% buyback yield”.

“Buyback yield” is very misleading. As the source of funds for Buybacks is operating cash, it should be first and foremost compared to what they would have achieved if invested.
A 3% “buyback yield” is greatly inferior to investing in the company’s business, acquisitions, or even a Special Dividend which would be shared by all Shareholders in hard dollars as opposed the soft dollar benefit attributable to fewer shares.
Here is an example of a typical S&P 500 equity. It has a market cap of $15 billion; its shares are at 15x earnings and it buys back 3% of its outstanding shares. This is compared to a hypothetical but very conservative Investment producing 3% in the 1st year, 8% in the 2nd and 10% thereafter. (This analysis is independent of the underlying profitability of the company.)

feb7-chart1

The share purchase of 3% of the float produces a 3.5% pop in the EPS on day one.  Annualized that is 3.5% in the first year, 1.7% per annum in the second and so on declining each year.  By the second year, the Investment produces a higher return.  By year 8, the Investment led to a Net Profit of $985m which is almost double the first year’s investment while the Buyback produced zero contribution to Net Profit.

Were the stock price reduced by half and the Buyback amount kept the same you would get the following result.

feb7-chart2

The original gain in EPS is increased to 7% but it soon pales by comparison to the Investment.

Using the original price of $15 and twice the buyback funds ($1,000m), the result would be the same as in the previous example but the dollar gain in the Net Profit from Investing would double as twice the funds were used.

feb7-chart3

These hypothetical examples illustrate the mechanics of stock buybacks.  Now let us look at two actual examples.

The first is Apple as it is listed as the most aggressive in terms of dollar amount of funds spent on buybacks in the last 12 months.[2]

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Despite Apple having spent the over $30 billion, it confirms the disadvantages of Buybacks compared to Investments.  In this case we used the average Return on Capital that they earned from 2009-15.

Now let us look at one of the most aggressive buyback programs in terms of the percentage of stock that was bought.  Corning Inc. purchased over 20% of their outstanding shares in the last 12 months [3] which produces an initial gain of 27% in EPS on day one.

feb7-chart5

However, even this aggressive program fails by beat the Investment after year three even though Corning’s Return on Capital is only averages at 10.3% over the 7 years. This illustrates that even massive amounts of buybacks can’t change the fundamental disadvantage compared to investing.

One of the reasons that investors are not more critical of management for stock buyback programs may be because, by doing it year after year, it creates the illusion that it is compounding.  As shown here, each year’s transactions is still the equivalent of getting simple interest.

The proof of this is found in the Net Profit Test[4]. It answers the question:

What is the Required Rate of return on an Investment of the funds, that would grow the Net Profit at the same rate that the EPS grew due to fewer shares.  Like Apple, the answer is surprisingly low in most instances.  We analyzed 30 stocks[5] whose buyback programs resulted in a median decline of 25% of their outstanding shares from 2008 to 2015. The median Required Return would have been only 4.9%.

The median growth rate for their EPS was 7.7% pa while the Net Profit grew only at 2.4%.  Instead, by investing at less than 5%, the Net Profit would have been 42% higher in the 7th year. Over the seven years the cumulative gain in Net Profit would have been 1.8x the original investment.

It makes no sense to put the growth of Earnings per Share ahead of the growth of Net Profit and as a result, the growth of the Market Capitalization.

A Simple Test to Dispel the Illusion Behind Stock Buybacks

Fair Game

By GRETCHEN MORGENSON AUG. 12, 2016

“Mr. Colby has developed an illuminating analysis that identifies a crucial difference between many truly successful companies and their underperforming counterparts. The exercise highlights the growth mirage that buybacks have on earnings-per-share measures. In addition, it shows that returns on investment need not be that large for a company to generate growth rates exceeding the evanescent earnings-per-share gains associated with buybacks.”

Footnotes

1.Factset Buyback Quarterly December 19, 2016. Defined as the buyback funds divided by the market capitalization.
2.Factset
3.Factset
4.The Net Profit Test: Comparing Buybacks to Investment
5.Stocks with significant buybacks between 2008-2015

© 2017 Robert L. Colby

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Gretchen Morgenson’s article on Buybacks, NY Times March 25th 2016

BUSINESS DAY

In Yahoo, Another Example of the Buyback Mirage

Becca Hary, a McDonald’s spokeswoman, said the company had a “balanced and disciplined capital-allocation strategy that promotes long-term value for our shareholders.” She cited McDonald’s plans to invest $2 billion to open a thousand new restaurants and “to reimage 400 to 500 locations” domestically.
In an interview, Mr. Colby said his research “confirms my suspicion that while buybacks are not universally bad, they are being practiced far more broadly and without as much analysis as there should be.”
Perhaps the crucial flaw in buybacks is that they reward sellers of a company’s stock over its long-term holders. That’s because a company announcing a repurchase program usually sees its stock price pop in the short term. But passive investors, such as index funds, and other long-term holders gain little from the programs.
Especially problematic are buybacks financed with borrowed money; repurchases of stock made at prices above its intrinsic value are also unwise.
Another hazard: companies that spend billions to repurchase stock without substantially shrinking the number of shares outstanding. That’s because in these circumstances, prized corporate cash is used to buy back shares that offset stock grants bestowed on company executives in rich compensation plans.
And there are plenty of companies whose buybacks have simply left them with less money to invest in more promising opportunities.
By throwing away money on buybacks, companies are giving up on the ability to grow in the future,” said Michael Lebowitz, an investment consultant and macrostrategist at 720 Global in Chevy Chase, Md.
At last, some investors are stirring on this issue. Domini Funds, a mutual fund company, and the A.F.L.-C.I.O.’s investment funds have submitted shareholder resolutions on share buybacks at 3M, Illinois Tool Works, Target and Xerox this year.
The proposals ask the companies to adopt a policy of excluding the effect of stock buybacks from any performance metrics they use to determineexecutive pay packages.
“We’re not against buybacks,” said Adam M. Kanzer, a managing director at Domini. “The question is at what point do buybacks become excessive and when do they undermine the long-term value of the company?”
At 3M, for example, research and development expenditures plus strategic acquisitions have totaled $22 billion over the last five years, Mr. Kanzer said. In the meantime, the company’s buyback program has cost $21 billion.
“When the buyback almost equals all the other expenditures, it makes sense to ask questions about whether there’s a more constructive way to invest that capital,” Mr. Kanzer said.
Asked about these questions, Lori Anderson, a 3M spokeswoman, referred me to the company’s proxy filing, which stated, “We believe these concerns are unfounded, as demonstrated by our long-term track record and our balanced capital-allocation approach.”
A group of institutional investors will also convene soon to examine the pros and cons of buybacks. The Shareholder Forum, which conducts independent programs to provide information that helps investors make sound decisions, is starting a new program on the topic.
“You really have to ask why a company’s board decides to return a big chunk of capital instead of replacing managers with ones who can figure out how to develop the operations,” said Gary Lutin, who oversees the Shareholder Forum.
“If the board doesn’t think it’s worth investing in the company’s future,” Mr. Lutin added, “how can a shareholder justify continuing to hold the stock, or voting for directors who’ve given up?”